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On the windy banks of the Missouri River near Cannon Ball, North 
Dakota lies the site of Iŋyaŋ Wakháŋagapi Othí, translated to English as 
Sacred Stone Camp.1 For 328 days, citizens of the Standing Rock Lakota and 
Dakota Sioux Nations and their allies occupied Sacred Stone and three 
satellite camps, protesting construction of the Dakota Access oil pipeline.2 
As pipeline construction neared the camp site, construction company security 
and law enforcement clashed with protestors.3 The Standing Rock Sioux 
Tribe also challenged the pipeline in federal court, filing its request for 
declaratory and injunctive relief in the District Court for the District of 
Columbia in July 2016.4 More than four years after state authorities forcibly 
terminated the protest at Sacred Stone, the Tribe’s legal challenge continues.5  
 
1 SACRED STONE CAMP - IŊYAŊ WAKHÁŊAGAPI OTHÍ, http://www.sacredstonecamp.org 
[https://perma.cc/CB3W-VTXN] (last visited Jan. 10, 2021). 
2 Id.; Amy Sisk, Timeline: The Long Road to #NoDAPL, INSIDE ENERGY (Jan. 23, 2017), http:// 
insideenergy.org/2017/01/23/timeline-the-long-road-to-nodapl/ [https://perma.cc/S2K9- M8CB]. 
3 Alan Taylor, Tempers Flare During Protest Against the Dakota Access Pipeline, THE 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2016/09/tempers-flare-during-
protest-against-the-dakota-access-pipeline/498809/ [https://perma.cc/W48X-FXBS]; Sue 
Skalicky & Monica Davey, Tension Between Police and Standing Rock Protesters Reaches 
Boiling Point, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/29/us/dakota-
access-pipeline-protest.html [https://perma.cc/DB59-46XY]. 
4 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 239 F. Supp. 3d 77 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 16-cv-1534). Note that additional 
cases filed by the Yankton Sioux and Oglala Sioux Tribes have been consolidated with this 
matter (16-1796 and 17-267). 
5 Morgan Conley, Tribes Press for Shutdown of Dakota Access Pipeline, LAW360 (Jan. 8, 2021), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1343135/tribes-press-for-shutdown-of-dakota-access-pipeline 
[https://perma.cc/JE8J-XWXY]; Mitch Smith, Standing Rock Protest Camp, Once Home to 
Thousands, Is Razed, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/23/us/ 
standing-rock-protest-dakota-access-pipeline.html [https://perma.cc/YT5X-KV59].  




Although the Dakota Access pipeline is privately owned, the Tribe filed 
its request for legal relief against the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.6 First, the 
Tribe challenged the processes through which the Corps issued authorizations to 
build the Dakota Access pipeline underneath bodies of water upstream from the 
Standing Rock reservation and to discharge into waters on tribal ancestral lands.7 
More broadly, the Tribe also challenged the processes governing the Corps’ 
nationwide permit for the construction of oil pipelines that impact water 
sources.8 These processes, the Tribe alleged, violated the federal statutory and 
regulatory requirement that federal agencies adequately consult recognized 
Indian tribes prior to authorizing infrastructure actions with potential impacts 
on culturally or religiously significant sites.9  
Although the Standing Rock Tribe’s complaint contains other claims, 
the alleged failure of the Corps to adequately and meaningfully consult the 
Tribe prior to authorizing construction on the Dakota Access pipeline is 
central to the parties’ dispute.10 The Tribe contends that any consultation by 
the Corps as to the planned construction’s impact on sites of historic and 
cultural significance was cursory, belated, and incomplete, thus failing to 
meet the standard for consultation as established by federal law.11 The Corps, 
in contrast, alleges that it engaged in a “robust consultation process” during 
its review and subsequent approval of Dakota Access pipeline construction 
plans, providing the Tribe with reasonable opportunities to advise the Corps 
on historic properties and making routine efforts to engage on matters of 
cultural sensitivity.12 What the Corps describes as reasonable consultation 
constitutes—from the Tribe’s perspective—an “attempt to circumvent the 
[consultation] process” and mere rubber stamping of Dakota Access’s 
development plans.13 
 
6 As of the time of editing, the case remains open. Note that the private owner of the pipeline 
project, Dakota Access LLC (a subsidiary of Energy Transfer Partners), entered the case as 
an unopposed intervenor—and then a cross-claimant—on August 5, 2016. Unopposed 
Motion to Intervene in Support of Defendant by Dakota Access LLC, Standing Rock Sioux 
Tribe, 239 F. Supp. 3d 77 (No. 16-cv-1534). 
7 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 239 F. 
Supp. 3d 77 (No. 16-cv-1534). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 31–40. 
10 Leigh Paterson, Tribal Consultation at Heart of Pipeline Fight, INSIDE ENERGY (Sept. 23, 
2016), http://insideenergy.org/2016/09/23/tribal-consultation-at-heart-of-pipeline-fight/ [https:// 
perma.cc/Y5KX-QALY]. 
11 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 31–40, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 239 
F. Supp. 3d 77 (No. 16-cv-1534). 
12 United States Army Corps of Engineers’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction at 28, 34–35, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 239 F. Supp. 3d 77 (No. 16-cv-1534). 
13 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 25, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 239 F. 
Supp. 3d 77 (No. 16-cv-1534). 
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The Standing Rock Sioux protest and legal challenge to the Dakota 
Access pipeline is not unique. Instead, it is part of an ongoing continent-wide 
story and history of agency failure to adequately and meaningfully consult 
tribes on major infrastructure projects. Tribal opposition to oil and gas 
pipelines is on the rise, as are protests and legal challenges to infrastructure 
projects generally, including renewable energy installations.14 The primary 
legal argument underpinning these challenges is that, in failing to adequately 
consult tribes impacted by project plans, federal agencies violate federal 
law.15 The high visibility and violence of the Standing Rock protests, and the 
intensity of the legal battle between the Standing Rock Tribe and Dakota 
Access, appear to have caught the attention of both the executive and 
legislative branches.16 Despite governmental awareness of the need for 
improved, meaningful consultation, Congress and federal agencies persist in 
using and abusing consultation in statutes, regulations, and guidance, leaning 
on an unworkable device to discharge their obligation to engage with 
impacted tribes.17 But the physical and legal clashes of Standing Rock will 
recur so long as consultation—a deeply flawed tool—is the default device for 
tribe-agency engagement on major infrastructure projects.18 
 
14 See Troy A. Eid, Beyond Dakota Access Pipeline: Energy Development and the Imperative 
for Meaningful Tribal Consultation, 95 DENV. L. REV. 593, 599–601, 603 (2018) 
(summarizing recent examples of tribal action against pipeline construction or right of way 
permit renewals, as well as against renewable energy farm construction). 
15 Id. at 601–03. 
16 In September 2016, for example, the U.S. Departments of the Interior, the Army, and Justice 
invited 567 federally recognized tribal governments to participate in listening sessions and 
formal tribal consultations on agency processes for infrastructure-related decision-making. 
Press Release, U.S. Department of the Interior, The Departments of the Army, the Interior and 
Justice Invite Tribal Leaders to Participate in Formal Government-to-Government 
Consultations on Infrastructure Decision-Making (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.doi.gov/ 
pressreleases/departments-army-interior-and-justice-invite-tribal-leaders-participate-formal 
[https://perma.cc/H77R-3GQB]. Standing Rock also prompted twenty-six members of 
Congress to request that the U.S. Government Accountability Office prepare a report 
investigating all related federal agencies’ policies for tribal consultation during infrastructure 
permitting and construction processes. See, e.g., Letter from Raul Ruiz, Ranking Member, 
House Subcomm. on Indian, Insular & Alaska Native Affs., & Raúl M. Grijalva, Ranking 
Member, House Comm. on Nat. Res., to Gene Dodaro, Comptroller Gen. of the U.S. (Sept. 8, 
2016), https://ruiz.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/ruiz-grijalva-call-greater-oversight-
protect-health-and-environmental [https://perma.cc/ZKW4-ZVCU]. The report was publicly 
released in March 2019. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-22, TRIBAL 
CONSULTATION: ADDITIONAL FEDERAL ACTIONS NEEDED FOR INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS 
(2019), https://www.gao.gov/assets/ 700/697694.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3GU-QPTM].  
17 See infra Section II.C.3. 
18 See, e.g., Nick Martin, The Next Standing Rock Is Everywhere, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 7, 2019), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/155209/next-standing-rock-everywhere [https://perma.cc/ 
ZKW4-ZVCU] (“There will not be another Standing Rock. There will be dozens, maybe 
even hundreds, by the time the fight to avoid the encroaching crisis is finished, if it ever is.”). 




 This Article argues that consultation, as a legal mechanism to 
guarantee effective, sovereign-to-sovereign engagement and agreement on 
major infrastructure projects, has not and will not work. Discussion of how 
to improve and standardize consultation practice validates continued 
congressional use of consultation as an engagement device and crowds out 
discussion of potential (more effective and accountable) alternatives. Part I 
identifies the statutory, regulatory, and executive authorities requiring 
consultation between federal agencies overseeing major infrastructure 
projects and the tribes impacted by construction. Part II traces the failures of 
administrative procedure, judicial review, and legislative oversight to 
guarantee meaningful consultation, and demonstrates that consultation is an 
inherently flawed engagement device given its fundamental inability to be 
checked by legal and administrative oversight. Part III advocates for 
congressional and administrative reform by suggesting a spectrum of possible 
alternative engagement devices, including negotiated rulemaking, adversarial 
administrative adjudication, negotiated compact, and formal consent, each of 
which could provide for heightened accountability and make for better 
policy.  
 
I. CONSULTATION: THE STATUS QUO FOR TRIBE-AGENCY ENGAGEMENT 
ON MAJOR INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS 
 
A network of federal statutes, regulations, executive directives, and 
international guidance require or encourage federal agencies to consult with tribes 
prior to authorizing, funding, and permitting major infrastructure construction 
projects.19 The key components of federal law mandating tribal consultation for 
infrastructure projects are the 1966 National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) 
and the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 
 
A. The National Historic Preservation Act 
 
The NHPA uses federal measures “to foster conditions under which 
our modern society and our historic property can exist in productive harmony 
and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future 
generations” and to assist federally recognized tribes “to expand and 
accelerate their historic preservation programs and activities.”20 Recognizing 
 
19 See generally Matthew J. Rowe, Judson Byrd Finley & Elizabeth Baldwin, Accountability 
or Merely “Good Words”? An Analysis of Tribal Consultation Under the National 
Environmental Policy Act and the National Historic Preservation Act, 8 ARIZ. J. ENV’T L. & 
POL’Y 1 (2018) (providing an overview of the tribe-agency consultation requirement). 
20 54 U.S.C. §§ 300101(1), (6). The NHPA was enacted in 1966, but language considering 
the impact of development on culturally and historically significant tribal lands was not 
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an implicit tension between historic and cultural preservation and modern 
development and infrastructure, Section 106 of the NHPA requires federal 
agencies with jurisdiction over a proposed “undertaking” to consider “the 
effect of the undertaking on any historic property.”21 An “undertaking” is “a 
project, activity, or program funded in whole or in part under the direct or 
indirect jurisdiction of a Federal agency,” including projects carried out with 
Federal funds or requiring a Federal permit or license.22 Historic property 
includes not only “any prehistoric or historic district, site, building, structure, 
or object” but also “artifacts, records, and material remains relating to a district, 
site, building, structure, or object.”23 Section 106 review requires that, in 
evaluating the effect of an undertaking on a historic property, federal agencies 
consider “property of traditional religious and cultural importance to an Indian 
tribe,” requiring consultation with Tribes so impacted.24 
The NHPA established the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation 
(ACHP), an independent agency that engages in the consultative process and 
also promulgates the regulations required to implement Section 106 review.25 
Section 106 regulations provide guidance and procedures by which federal 
agencies fulfil their statutory obligations to consult; the regulations state that 
“[t]he goal of consultation is to identify historic properties potentially 
affected by the undertaking, assess its effects and seek ways to avoid, 
minimize or mitigate any adverse effects on historic properties.”26 The 
Section 106 process requires federal agencies to “make a reasonable and good 
faith effort” to identify parties potentially impacted by a proposed project 
and, in the tribal context, to consult with the identified tribal historic 
 
included until 1992 amendments to the Act. See Reclamation Projects Authorization and 
Adjustment Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4600 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 16, 25, and 43 U.S.C.) (enacting new law on tribal historic preservation 
programs). See generally S. Rheagan Alexander, Tribal Consultation for Large-Scale 
Projects: The National Historic Preservation Act and Regulatory Review, 32 PACE L. REV. 
895 (2012) (providing a complete overview on consultation under the NHPA). 
21 54 U.S.C. § 306108. 
22 Id. § 300320; see also United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in Okla. v. FCC, 933 
F.3d 728, 734 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“We have construed the statute to mean that, for an action 
to be a federal undertaking, ‘only a “Federal permit, license or approval” is required,’ not 
necessarily federal funding.”). 
23 54 U.S.C. § 300308. 
24 Id. § 302706.  
25 Id. § 304108(a); see About the ACHP, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION, 
https://www.achp.gov/about [https://perma.cc/84A5-J9ZA] (last visited Jan. 10, 2021) (“The 
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation promotes the preservation, enhancement, and 
sustainable use of our nation’s diverse historic resources, and advises the President and the 
Congress on national historic preservation policy.”). 
26 36 C.F.R. § 800.1(a) (2019).  




preservation officer (THPO) for each impacted tribe.27 Consultation “should 
commence early in the planning process,” and, in a two-step process, provide 
the tribe with “a reasonable opportunity” to advise the agency on 
identification and evaluation of significant historic and cultural properties as 
well as to share its concerns about the undertaking’s potential impact on those 
properties.28 This consultation is required not only for tribally-owned lands 
but also on other lands to which tribes attach historic or cultural 
significance.29 Section 106 regulations emphasize that, in recognition of the 
“unique legal relationship” between the federal government and tribal 
governments, consultation “should be conducted in a sensitive manner 
respectful of tribal sovereignty.”30 The consultative process about a planned 
undertaking is to recognize this “government-to-government” relationship.31 
Section 106 consultation should occur concurrently with NEPA consultation 
and analysis, as environmental analyses and impact statements must consider 
impact on cultural resources.32 
Once the agency concludes its consultation process and identifies a 
plan to proceed with the undertaking, it signs a programmatic agreement that 
resolves any adverse effect on property of historic, religious, or cultural 
significance.33 “Compliance with the procedures established by an approved 
programmatic agreement satisfies the agency's [S]ection 106 responsibilities 
for all individual undertakings of the program covered by the agreement . . . .”34 
Signing of the programmatic agreement “clos[es] the record for purposes of 
NHPA § 106.”35 
 Complicating this regulatory landscape in the infrastructure context 
are inconsistencies in U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) Section 106 
procedures. The Corps Civil Works Division is responsible for water resource 
development and management; private pipeline projects must get permission 
from Civil Works for a pipeline to cross federal land or to impact Corps 
 
27 Id. §§ 800.1–800.2. When an impacted tribe has no THPO, the tribal government may designate 
a representative to consult with the federal agency. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HIST. PRES., 
CONSULTATION WITH INDIAN TRIBES IN THE SECTION 106 REVIEW PROCESS: A HANDBOOK 7 
(2012), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2016/02/f30/consultation-indian-tribe-handbook.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X5NC-BHC8] (“The tribe retains the same consultation rights regarding 
agency findings and determinations, and to execute a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) 
or Programmatic Agreement (PA), as it would if it had a THPO.”). 
28 36 C.F.R. § 800.2(c)(3)(i) (2019). 
29 Id. § 800.2(c)(3)(ii). 
30 Id.  
31 Id. § 800.2(c)(3)(iii). 
32 Id. § 800.8(a)(1); see infra Section I.B. 
33 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.13–800.14 (2019). 
34 Id. § 800.14(b)(2)(iii). 
35 Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. FERC, 545 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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projects.36 The Corps Regulatory Program, a subdivision of Civil Works, is 
the division that actually reviews permit applications and issues permits for 
any construction or other infrastructure project impacting U.S. navigable 
waters.37 Although Civil Works generally follows ACHP regulations 
governing procedures for engaging in NHPA Section 106 review, the 
Regulatory Program does not.38 Instead, the Regulatory Program follows its 
own procedures for implementing Section 106.39 Agencies may use their own 
alternative Section 106 regulations but ACHP must approve those 
alternatives and the alternatives must employ standards consistent with the 
ACHP regulations; the Corps’ Regulatory Program’s alternate regulations 
have never been approved.40 A 2019 U.S. Government Accountability Office 
Report on tribal consultation during the infrastructure development process 
highlighted this regulatory bifurcation as a violation of the NHPA that should 
be resolved through congressional action.41  
 The ACHP also produces guidance on improving the consultation 
relationship between agencies and tribes. The latest report, issued in 
September 2015, identified staffing and resource scarcity, diversity, and the 
role of permit applicants—who often apply for permits at a time when they 
already bear substantial sunk costs in planning and historic preservation 
 
36 Civil Works, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGR’S, https://www.usace.army.mil/Missions/Civil-Works/ 
[https://perma.cc/C7RC-BEGZ] (last visited Jan. 10, 2021); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFF., supra note 16, at 51 n.86. 
37 Civil Works: Regulatory Program Links, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, https://www. 
usace.army.mil/Missions/Civil-Works/Regulatory-Program-and-Permits/ [https://perma.cc/ 
K2DD-D94Q] (last visited Jan. 10, 2021); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 
16, at 51 n.86. 
38 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 16, at 51. 
39 The Regulatory Program’s Section 106 procedures come from a 1990 Corps regulation, a 
2005 Corps guidance document, and a 2007 Corps memorandum. 33 C.F.R. pt. 325, app. C 
(2019); Memorandum from Michael B. White, Chief, Operations, Directorate of Civil 
Works, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, on Revised Interim Guidance for Implementing 
Appendix C of 33 CFR Part 325 with the Revised Advisory Council on Historic Preservation 
Regulations at 36 CFR Part 800 (April 25, 2005) (on file with the U.S. Army); Memorandum 
from Lawrence A. Lang, Acting Chief, Operations, Directorate of Civil Works, U.S. Army Corps 
of Eng’rs, on Clarification of Revised Interim Guidance for Implementing Appendix C of 33 CFR 
Part 325 with the Revised Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP) Regulations at 36 
CFR Part 800 dated 25 April 2005 (Jan. 31, 2007) (on file with the U.S. Army). 
40 36 C.F.R. § 800.14 (2019); 54 U.S.C. § 306102(b)(5)(A); see also U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 16, at 52–54 (describing alternative USACE regulations 
and the ACHP approval process and noting that the ACHP has never approved USACE 
alternative regulations). 
41 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 16, at 55 (“The long-standing nature of the 
differences between the Corps procedures and the ACHP regulations, as well as the agencies’ 
inability to resolve these differences over almost two decades despite numerous attempts to 
do so, suggests that legislative action may be needed to resolve this issue.”). 




analysis—as challenges to the consultative process.42 Suggested solutions 
included regular scheduled meetings, consultation agreements, documented 
consultation standards, better training for agency staff on tribal needs, and 
better use of tribal expertise during planning processes.43 
 
B. National Environmental Policy Act 
 
The second statutory prong governing tribe-agency consultation on 
major infrastructure is the NEPA, which requires preparation of an 
environmental assessment or environmental impact statement for proposed 
projects. Congress enacted the NEPA to “promote efforts which will prevent 
or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the 
health and welfare of man.”44 As such, NEPA requires that all “major Federal 
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment” trigger 
an environmental review.45 As with the NHPA, the NEPA established a body 
to create and oversee implementing regulations.46 Regulations promulgated 
by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), housed within the 
Executive Office of the President, define “major Federal action” broadly, 
including any activity or project “entirely or partly financed, assisted, 
conducted, regulated, or approved by Federal agencies.”47 CEQ regulations 
require initiation of NEPA environmental assessment requirements early in 
the planning process.48 The NEPA environmental review process constitutes 
preparation of either an Environmental Assessment or an Environmental 
Impact Statement, depending on the project’s degree of likely environmental 
impact.49 CEQ regulations require that federal agencies undertaking major 
 
42 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HIST. PRES., RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING TRIBAL-FEDERAL 
CONSULTATION 1–2 (2015), https://www.achp.gov/sites/default/files/guidance/2018-06/Rec 
ommendationsforImprovingTribal-FederalConsultation14Sep2015.pdf [perma.cc/4N92-P2JH]. 
43 Id. at 3–4. 
44 42 U.S.C. § 4321. 
45 Id. § 4332(C). 
46 Id. § 4342. 
47 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2019). 
48 Id. § 1500.1(b). 
49 Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National 
Environmental Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 43,304, 43,321 (July 16, 2020) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. § 1501.3(a)). The Environmental Assessment (EA) is a relatively brief review of the 
project’s environmental impact with either a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) or a 
finding of likely significant impact, which then triggers the more in-depth review required 
by an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). An EIS has significantly more elaborate 
requirements, starting with publication of a Notice of Intent in the Federal Register, a scoping 
process identifying interested stakeholders, a full analysis of the environmental effects of a 
proposed plan and of alternative plans (including no action), publication of the draft EIS, a 
public comment period, publication of the final EIS with responses to substantive comments 
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actions requiring NEPA review assess the impact of those actions on cultural 
resources.50 This assessment requires agencies to consult “early with 
appropriate State, Tribal, and local governments . . . when their involvement is 
reasonably foreseeable.”51 This regulatory requirement to consult impacted 
tribes as part of the environmental assessment process does not define what 
constitutes adequate consultation.52 
The Federal Permitting Improvement Steering Council (FPISC) also 
impacts implementation of NEPA. Created in 2015 to make the permitting 
processes for large infrastructure projects more centralized and efficient, 
FPISC is made up of 16 federal agencies, departments, councils, and 
commissions involved in these large federal projects.53 FPISC identifies and 
advises member agencies and departments on best practices for permitting 
and environmental review, including for improving stakeholder 
engagement.54 In its latest report on recommended best practices, FPISC 
issued several recommendations related to tribal consultation. FPISC 
recommended that lead agencies engaging in NEPA review collaborate with 
tribes to develop standards for identifying resources potentially impacted by 
proposed infrastructure projects and, when project ideas are identified, to 
consult with tribes before rather than after initiating review processes.55 
 
C. Executive Directives 
 
Although not legally binding, multiple executive directives issued 
over the last 20 years emphasize presidential concern for the importance of 
tribal voices during infrastructure planning processes. 
 
received, and issuance of the Record of Decision, stating the agency’s final conclusion on 
environmental impact. Id. at 43,323–26, 43,328, 43,333. 
50 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (2019). 
51 Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National 
Environmental Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. at 43,360.  
52 Id. at 43,367. 
53 Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, 129 Stat. 1312 (2015) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12, 16, 22, 23, 26, 40, 42, and 49 U.S.C.). 
Current members of FPISC are the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, Council on 
Environmental Quality, Department of Agriculture, Department of the Army, Department of 
Commerce, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland 
Security, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Department of the Interior, 
Department of Transportation, Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission, General Services Administration, Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, and Office of Management and Budget. 
54 42 U.S.C. § 4370m-1(c)(2)(B). 
55 FED. PERMITTING IMPROVEMENT STEERING COUNCIL, RECOMMENDED BEST PRACTICES 
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEWS AND AUTHORIZATIONS FOR INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS FOR 
FISCAL YEAR 2019, at  3–4 (2019), https://www.permits.performance.gov/sites/permits.dot. 
gov/files/2019-10/fast-41fy2019-best-practices-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ N63Q-HPZ9]. 




1. Executive order 13,175 
 
On November 6, 2000, President Bill Clinton issued Executive Order 
13,175, directing federal agencies to consult with recognized tribes on 
federally funded or directed activities with the potential to impact tribes.56 
The order recognized that the federal government has a unique trust 
relationship with tribal governments and, as such, ordered federal agencies 
making policy or engaging in other administrative action with tribal 
implications to engage in accountable, meaningful, and timely consultation 
with tribal officials.57 Agencies were directed to create and document 
consultation processes in conformity with the order.58 Finally, the order noted 
its issuance in conjunction with Executive Order 13,132, establishing parallel 
requirements for federal agencies to consult with states and localities when 
engaging in policymaking with federalism implications.59 
 
2. Presidential memoranda on tribal consultation 
 
In September 2004, President George W. Bush issued a memorandum 
affirming his administration’s support for Executive Order 13,175 and 
requesting that agency heads ensure compliance with the order’s directions.60 
President Barack Obama issued a subsequent memorandum to heads of 
executive departments and agencies in November 2009, requiring each body 
to develop a plan of action for “regular and meaningful consultation and 
collaboration with tribal officials in policy decisions that have tribal 
implications,” in compliance with the Clinton order.61 Although President 
Obama noted in his memorandum that “[h]istory has shown that failure to 
include the voices of tribal officials in formulating policy affecting their 
communities has all too often led to undesirable and, at times, devastating 
and tragic results,” he indicated that “meaningful dialogue” and specifically 
consultation, “is a critical ingredient of a sound and productive Federal-tribal 
relationship.”62  
 
56 Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 9, 2000). 
57 Id. at 67,249–50. Note that independent agencies such as the Federal Communications 
Commission and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission are “encouraged” to comply with 
EO 13,175 though they are not subject to it. Id. at 67,251. 
58 Id. at 67,250. 
59 Id. at 67,251; see Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255, 43,257 (Aug. 10, 1999) 
(“Each agency shall have an accountable process to ensure meaningful and timely input by 
State and local officials in the development of regulatory policies that have federalism 
implications.”). 
60 Memorandum on Government-to-Government Relationship with Tribal Governments, 2 
PUB. PAPERS 2177 (Sept. 23, 2004). 
61 Memorandum on Tribal Consultation, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 887 (Nov. 5, 2009). 
62 Id. 
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3. Increased presidential commitment to consultation 
 
President Obama increased Executive Branch investment in 
consultation when he issued Executive Order 13,647, establishing the White 
House Council on Native American Affairs.63 Vowing “[g]reater engagement 
and meaningful consultation with tribes,” President Obama directed the new 
Council to coordinate consultation across agencies and departments.64 
The Obama Administration subsequently issued annual reports from 
the Executive Office of the President providing updates on executive-tribal 
coordination. The 2016 report emphasized agency progress in formalizing 
and improving the consultation process, highlighting efforts from the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of the Treasury, 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Department of 
Energy, and the Social Security Administration.65 The 2017 report included 
reports on similar policy improvements by the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS), the Department of Agriculture (USDA), the 
Department of the Interior, and the Department of Education.66 
 
D. International Standards: United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous People 
 
Finally, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
People provides member nations with nonbinding guidance on recognizing 
and affirming indigenous political, economic, cultural, and property rights.67 
The Declaration advises member states to “consult and cooperate in good 
faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative 
institutions in order to obtain their free, prior, and informed consent before 
adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may  
 
 
63 Exec. Order No. 13,647, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,539 (July 1, 2013). 
64 Id. 
65 EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, 2015 WHITE HOUSE TRIBAL NATIONS CONFERENCE PROGRESS 
REPORT: BUILDING PROSPEROUS AND RESILIENT TRIBAL NATIONS 16, 26, 46, 52 (2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/2015%20Tribal%20N
ations%20Conference%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4B47-PYBV]. 
66 EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, 2016 WHITE HOUSE TRIBAL NATIONS CONFERENCE 
PROGRESS REPORT: A RENEWED ERA OF FEDERAL-TRIBAL RELATIONS 9–11, 16 (2017), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/whncaa_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
E4DE-44HF]. This report also highlighted the inter-agency review of consultation on 
infrastructure projects initiated by the Departments of the Interior, Justice, and the Army in 
2016. Id. at 14. 
67 G.A. Res. 61/295, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Oct. 2, 2007). 




affect them.”68 The Declaration also advises member states to 
consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous 
peoples concerned through their own representative 
institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent 
prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or 
territories and other resources, particularly in connection with 
the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water 
or other resources.69 
The United States voted against the United Nations Declaration in 
2007 but changed its position to support the Declaration in January 2011.70 
The State Department’s 2011 announcement recognized the “moral and 
political force” of the Declaration, but also interpreted the Declaration’s 
advice as aligning squarely with preexisting federal statutory and regulatory 
consultation requirements.71 Referencing Executive Order 13,175 and 
President Obama’s 2009 memorandum as evidence of the federal tradition of 
consultation, the State Department recognized “the significance of the 
Declaration’s provisions on free, prior and informed consent” but noted that 
the federal government understood those provisions “to call for a process of 
meaningful consultation with tribal leaders, but not necessarily the agreement 
of those leaders, before the actions addressed in those consultations are 
taken.”72 Recognition and endorsement of the United Nations Declaration 
effected no change on federal law or policy.73 
 
II. CONSULTATION’S FAILURE 
 
Despite guidance from diverse legal authorities—including statutes, 
regulations, guidance, executive directives, and international declaration—
conflict among federal agencies and departments, private infrastructure 
developers, and tribal governments and communities persists. If the degree 
of visibility and intensity of litigation over the Dakota Access pipeline are 
 
68 Id. art. 19. For a full analysis of the free, prior, and informed consent model, see generally 
Carla F. Fredericks, Operationalizing Free, Prior, and Informed Consent, 80 ALB. L. REV. 
429 (2017). 
69 G.A. Res. 61/295, supra note 67, art. 32. 
70 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ANNOUNCEMENT OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS 
DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (Jan. 12, 2011), https://2009-
2017.state.gov/documents/organization/154782.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q2AH-DCC8]; see 
also Remarks at the White House Tribal Nations Conference, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 
1076 (Dec. 16, 2010) (indicating President Barack Obama’s support for the United Nations 
Declaration). 
71 ANNOUNCEMENT OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE 
RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, supra note 70.  
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
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any marker, tribe-developer-agency conflict is, in fact, on the rise. Is there 
any hope for tribal consultation as a legal mechanism for ensuring meaningful 
intergovernmental respect and consensus? 
Failing to confront the fundamental, inherent internal contradictions 
in consultation requirements, several scholars of administrative and tribal law 
insist consultation can work. The general consensus among these scholars is 
that the “regular and meaningful consultation” promised in Executive Order 
13,175 and reaffirmed in subsequent presidential memoranda has not—or has 
rarely—come to pass,74 but that adherence to best practices or to an 
articulated uniform standard would transform current consultation practices 
into the meaningful consultation theoretically intended by past presidents and 
policymakers.75 Existing protections and obligations to honor tribal 
 
74 Michael Eitner, Meaningful Consultation with Tribal Governments: A Uniform Standard 
to Guarantee that Federal Agencies Properly Consider Their Concerns, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 
867, 900 (2014); see also Michalyn Steele, Congressional Power and Sovereignty in Indian 
Affairs, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 307, 344 (2018) (“Congress should affirm tribes’ status as key 
stakeholders in environmental, homeland security, public safety, energy, education, health, 
and other national concerns and enact requirements for meaningful consultation with 
tribes.”); Heather J. Tanana & John C. Ruple, Energy Development in Indian Country: 
Working Within the Realm of Indian Law and Moving Towards Collaboration, 32 UTAH 
ENV’T L. REV. 1, 50 (2012) (“Consultation policies should be established within every 
federal agency as well as at the state-level. While the policies need to have some flexibility to 
account for the individual differences between tribes, sound principles should be followed . . . .”); 
Colette Routel & Jeffrey Holth, Toward Genuine Tribal Consultation in the 21st Century, 
46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 417, 474–75 (2013) (“The federal government’s trust 
responsibility includes an important procedural component: the duty to consult with 
Indian tribes. This consultation duty has the potential to breathe new life into the substantive 
components of the trust responsibility.”); Kathryn Sears Ore, Form and Substance: The 
National Historic Preservation Act, Badger-Two Medicine, and Meaningful Consultation, 
38 PUB. LAND & RES. L. REV. 205, 243 (2017) (“[C]onflicts demonstrate the importance of 
establishing common understandings of meaningful consultation, as well as the need to 
carefully explore and apply the lessons of circumstances, like the Badger-Two Medicine, 
where despite initial upsets meaningful consultation organically occurred.”); Dwight 
Newman et. al., Arctic Energy Development and Best Practices on Consultation with 
Indigenous Peoples, 32 B.U. INT’L L.J. 449, 454 (2014) (“Taking the general need for 
Indigenous consultation—and potentially participation—in Arctic energy development, this 
Article discusses the appropriate forms for that consultation and participation, taking into 
account the special context of the Arctic.”); Christy McCann, Dammed if You Do, Damned 
if You Don’t: FERC’s Tribal Consultation Requirement and the Hydropower Re-Licensing 
at Post Falls Dam, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 411, 454 (2006) (“While consultation may not be the 
solution to getting all tribal issues resolved favorably, it does offer an opportunity for 
progress. This opportunity justifies the investment of the time and resources necessary to 
make that consultation meaningful.”). 
75 See Eitner, supra note 74, at 900 (“A statute providing a government-wide standard for 
meaningful consultation and a mechanism by which agencies must justify decisions that run 
contrary to the views expressed by tribes would provide just such a guarantee. By doing so, 
the federal government would honor its general trust responsibility to Indian tribes and 
ensure that it will not revert to its past pattern of broken promises.”) 




sovereignty offered by NHPA and NEPA, they suggest, are adequate “when 
agencies undertake these obligations in good faith.”76 Better mechanisms to 
hold agencies to good faith efforts to consult would address these flaws.77 
Even scholars highly critical of consultation suggest that forcing 
consultation in practice to cohere with the spirit of statutory and regulatory 
consultation requirements could be a plausible solution to current failures to 
meaningfully engage tribes impacted by infrastructure development. Derek 
Haskew recognizes the inadequacy of consultation with tribes yet seems 
resigned to its use as a legal mechanism, writing that “the recent popularity of 
consultation requirements suggests they may be here for some time.”78 Haskew 
suggests that, given the ubiquity of statutory and regulatory consultation 
requirements, one “course of progress . . . would be to begin the process of 
raising consultations to their optimal expression as a legal device.”79 
Consultation is a fundamentally flawed engagement device. These 
calls to action for meaningful consultation through improved standards 
simply fail to grapple with the fact that, not only has consultation failed 
historically, it is a conceptually inadequate device. Consultation is inadequate 
because its chief benefit—its inherent flexibility that allows stakeholders to 
engage on terms that are individually and situationally significant—is also its 
weakness, in that its broad and discretionary model is ripe for agency inaction 
and abuse. This negative quality cannot be excised from the consultation 
model so as to make it a viable engagement device. I suggest here that 
triplicate failures of inadequate administrative procedure, judicial review, and 
legislative oversight make consultation inherently inadequate to serve its 
stated purpose of government-to-government engagement on large 
infrastructure projects. Scholars suggesting otherwise are not only incorrect; 
they implicitly support federal reliance on consultation and thus fail to hold 
political and executive actors accountable for their continued use of a device of 
engagement so flawed and obviously dismissive of tribal sovereignty.  
 
A. Administrative Procedure and Self-Regulation 
 
First, consultation fails because it is inherently subject to 
administrative failure. Consultation policies take the form of advisory action 
with no legally binding effect; unmanageable and vague guidance interprets 
equally unmanageable and vague statutory mandates. As such, consultation 
relies primarily on agencies to provide their own internal oversight and create 
their own legitimacy. Because consultation necessarily rests on values of 
 
76 Rowe, Finley & Baldwin, supra note 19, at 46. 
77 Id. at 47. 
78 Derek C. Haskew, Federal Consultation with Indian Tribes: The Foundation of Enlightened 
Policy Decisions, or Another Badge of Shame?, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 21, 74 (2000). 
79 Id. 
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agency discretion, reasonable action, and good faith, it also lacks an 
administrative backstop to protect stakeholder interests. 
Administrative procedure makes consultation ineffective because 
agencies’ consultation policies are informal guidance rather than binding 
rulemaking or adjudication. The statutory mandates in NHPA and NEPA 
require federal agencies to make reasonable, good faith efforts to consult with 
tribes, but provide no benchmark for measuring adequacy of consultation, 
and do not require that consultation procedures be formalized through notice-
and-comment rulemaking.80 Requirements for consultation to be meaningful 
and respectful of tribal sovereignty and the government-to-government 
interaction come instead from executive orders and memoranda that lack 
legal binding force.81 Consultation must occur in some form to comply with 
law, but any requirements for timing and quality of consultation, and for 
consideration of tribal views, are merely advisory and not legally required.82 
 As nonbinding guidance documents, agency policies on tribal 
consultation explicitly disclaim the creation of any legal rights. The Army 
Corps of Engineers’ Regulatory Program Tribal Consultation Policy contains 
the disclaimer that it “is not intended to, and does not grant, expand, create, 
or diminish any legally enforceable rights, benefits, or trust responsibilities, 
substantive or procedural, not otherwise granted or created under existing 
law.”83 Other agencies playing a role in regulating and permitting 
infrastructure development, including the Department of Energy, the 
Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, the Department of the Interior, and the Environmental 
Protection Agency, adhere to tribal consultation policies containing a 
 
80 54 U.S.C. § 302706; Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions 
of the National Environmental Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 43,304, 43,360 (July 16, 2020) (to 
be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1501.2). 
81 See., e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 9, 2000) (describing 
consultation requirements without discussing legal consequences from the failure to 
comply); see also Memorandum on Government-to-Government Relationship With Tribal 
Governments, supra note 60 (“[T]he head of each executive department and agency . . . shall 
continue to ensure to the greatest extent practicable and as permitted by United States law 
that the agency’s working relationship with federally recognized tribal governments respects 
the rights of self-government and self-determination . . . .); Memorandum on Tribal 
Relations, supra note 61 (directing agency heads to submit plans of action and progress 
reports to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget “to the extent permitted by 
law and consistent with [agencies’] statutory and regulatory authorities.”). 
82 See McCann, supra note 74, at 438 (“Agencies do not have to actually implement tribes’ 
recommendations; they are just required to listen to what tribes have to say. Agencies have 
the discretion to ignore, as long as they can show a meaningful consultation occurred.”) 
83 Memorandum from Thomas P. Bostick, Lieutenant General, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs on 
Tribal Consultation Policy 6 (2012) (on file with the U.S. Army). The Corps Policy also refers 
to broader Department of Defense consultation policies which offer the same disclaimer. 




functionally identical disclaimer, marking those policies as not legally 
binding guidance documents.84 
 Given the nonbinding nature of consultation policies and agreements, 
enforcement of meaningful and substantive consultation—at least in the 
administrative context—falls to the consulting agency. Consultation cannot 
work because agencies have no incentive to self-regulate or to limit their own 
discretion to consult only perfunctorily. Characterization of tribal 
consultation as a “box-checking exercise” is rooted in reality.85 Any hope of 
successful consultation rests upon agency “sincerity”; “[d]oes the agency or 
project proponent truly want to know what Indians think about a particular 
project or issue? Or are they simply checking the box ‘Have you 
consulted?’.”86 There is no reliable agency self-regulation mechanism to 
guarantee sincerity and good faith. 
 The absence of administrative checks on consultation failures may be 
part of a broader trend of agency practice that departs from “the series of 
assumptions” codified in the Administrative Procedure Act.87 Daniel Farber 
and Anne Joseph O’Connell contrast these traditional administrative law 
assumptions with the current status of the federal administrative state:  
[Traditional] assumptions call for statutory directives to be 
implemented by an agency led by Senate-confirmed 
presidential appointees with decision-making authority. The 
implementation is presumed to be through statutorily 
 
84 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE O 144.1, AMERICAN INDIAN & ALASKA NATIVE TRIBAL 
GOVERNMENT POLICY 6 (2009), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/DOE%20O%2014 
4.1.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RUH-RG5S]; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., TRIBAL 
CONSULTATION POLICY § V(B) (2011) https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ 
DHS%20Tribal%20Consulation%20Policy%20Final%20PDF_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6Q3-
VNHL]; Tribal Government-to-Government Consultation Policy, 81 Fed. Reg. 40,893, 
40,897 (Jun. 23, 2016); U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, POLICY ON CONSULTATION WITH 
INDIAN TRIBES 14 (2011), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/migrated/cobell/upload/ 
FINAL-Departmental-tribal-consultation-policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZAN9-CSY4]; U.S. 
ENV’T PROTECTION AGENCY, POLICY ON CONSULTATION AND COORDINATION WITH INDIAN 
TRIBES: GUIDANCE FOR DISCUSSING TRIBAL TREATY RIGHTS 1 (2016), https://www.epa.gov 
/sites/production/files/2016-02/documents/tribal_treaty_rights_guidance_for_discussing_ tribal_ 
treaty_rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GWP-5QLT]. Interestingly, the Department of the 
Interior undertook a nonbinding quasi-notice-and-comment process in developing its policy, 
soliciting and allegedly considering comments from over twenty tribal governments prior to 
issuing its 2011 policy as a response to the 2009 memorandum from President Obama. For 
a list of comments by section, see Tribal and Public Comments, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 
https://www.doi.gov/tribes/Tribal-and-Public-Comments [https://perma.cc/Y6HS-5WP9] (last 
visited Feb. 3, 2021). 
85 Rowe, Finley & Baldwin, supra note 19, at 17.  
86 DARBY C. STAPP & MICHAEL S. BURNEY, TRIBAL CULTURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: 
THE FULL CIRCLE TO STEWARDSHIP 119 (2002). 
87 Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 92 
TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1154 (2014). 
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mandated procedures and criteria, where the final result can 
then be reviewed by the courts to see if the reasons given by 
the agency at the time of action match the delegated 
directions. Yet, there are often statutory and executive 
directives to be implemented by multiple agencies, frequently 
missing confirmed leaders, where practical decision-making 
authority may rest outside of those agencies. The process of 
implementation also follows mandates in both statutes and 
executive orders, where the final result faces limited, if any, 
oversight by the courts.88 
Farber and O’Connell later list the costs that this shift inflicts on 
administrative law. Although written from a general administrative law 
perspective, this list could easily be read as an enumeration of the negative 
consequences of cursory and meaningless consultation: “loss of transparency 
for the regulated parties and the public; greater difficulty of congressional 
oversight . . . ; decreasing influence of the agency's unique expertise and 
knowledge of the record; and blurring or undermining delegation as the 
agency's statutory mandate is diluted by other policy and political goals.”89 
Agencies’ failure to adequately engage tribes as governments impacted by 
major infrastructure projects may be part of a broader trend of agency action 
largely beyond the reach of the APA, leaving impacted parties without 
substantial recourse when agencies fail to adequately self-regulate. 
Emily Hammond and David Markell identify three metrics for 
assessing the legitimacy of agency procedure (largely) absent judicial 
review.90 In other words, in the substantial discretionary space of agency 
action unlikely to face judicial review, how can we evaluate whether an 
agency is adequately self-regulating? Hammond and Markell’s three metrics 
are [1] how the procedure is used; [2] agency responsiveness to concerns and 
reason-giving for decisions; and [3] substantive outcomes of the procedure.91 
Application of all three metrics suggest legitimacy problems with 
consultation. Metric [1] involves consideration of the frequency with which 
citizens use the procedure and the substantive nature of that use; although 
tribal interest in engagement with agencies on the impact of infrastructure 
projects is high—and rising—that interest persists in spite of barriers to 
engagement that agencies are in the best position to mitigate, and the 
frequency of quality consultation is far lower than it could and should be.92 
Metric [2] evaluates agency responsiveness to expressed concerns and the 
 
88 Id. at 1154–55. 
89 Id. at 1175. 
90 Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial Review: 
Building Legitimacy from the Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 313, 327–330 (2013). 
91 Id. at 328. 
92 Id. at 328–29; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 16, at 20–27. 




degree of reason-giving for its decisions; tribes routinely point to poor agency 
communication, agency failure to consider tribal perspectives, and lack of 
agency accountability as significant barriers to the consultation process.93 
Metric [3] evaluates the degree to which the process meets substantive 
statutory goals and whether results are distributive and non-arbitrary; in this 
aspect, consultation presents its most extreme failures, given that results 
depend on agency attitude and willingness to consult early in the process and 
that agencies face increasing numbers of challenges for failure to consult.94 
Agency attempts to improve accountability to tribes during the 
infrastructure project consultation process, including attempts at collective 
oversight, have yet to pay dividends. The purpose of creating FPISC was to 
coordinate interagency permitting and environmental review for large 
infrastructure projects, and in December 2017 the FPISC Best Practices 
Report for fiscal year 2018 recommended creating a central database and 
notification system of areas of tribal interest and tribal consultation 
contacts.95 Despite President Donald Trump’s 2017 Executive Order 
directing agencies to implement FPISC’s annual best practices, there has 
been no decision or movement made on creating this central database.96 
 
B. Judicial Review 
 
Second, consultation fails because there is no meaningful judicial review 





93 Hammond & Markell, supra note 90, at 329; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra 
note 16, at 22–23. 
94 Hammond & Markell, supra note 90, at 329–30; STAPP & BURNEY, supra note 86, at 119–
20; Eid, supra note 14, at 600; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 16, 
at 2 (“According to the National Congress of American Indians, federal approval of certain 
infrastructure projects historically had negative effects on tribal communities, and tribes’ 
knowledge and expertise can help ensure that infrastructure projects are completed in a 
timely manner to avoid negative impacts on tribal resources and reduce the risk of subsequent 
disagreement or litigation.”). 
95 42 U.S.C. § 4370m-1(c)(2)(B); FED. PERMITTING IMPROVEMENT STEERING COUNCIL, 
RECOMMENDED BEST PRACTICES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEWS AND AUTHORIZATIONS FOR 
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018, at 4 (2017), https://cms8.permits. 
performance.gov/sites/permits.dot.gov/files/2019-10/fast-41fy-2018best-practices-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SH54-2UFC]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 16, at 35. 
96 Exec. Order No. 13,807, 82 Fed. Reg. 40,463, 40,464–65 (Aug. 24, 2017). FPISC’s 
inaction persists despite agencies’ alleged support for such a central information and 
notification system and suggestions that individual agency systems could be scaled up to 
create a central system for all agencies participating in the large infrastructure permitting and 
planning process. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 16, at 35–37. 
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1. Arbitrary and capricious review under the APA 
 
Judicial review is rarely adequate to the task of enforcing the tribal 
right to meaningful engagement. Before seeking judicial review, tribes—like 
any party hoping to challenge agency action—generally need to exhaust any 
available administrative remedies.97 When a tribe wishes to bring a failure-to-
consult claim under NHPA or NEPA, the exact requirements for exhaustion 
are not clear, but relevant case law suggests tribes must explicitly attempt to 
initiate consultation.98 Agency publication of notices of project approval or 
environmental assessments under NHPA or NEPA are adequate notice to 
interested tribes for purposes of the exhaustion requirement.99 
 
97   
Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for 
which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial 
review . . . . Except as otherwise expressly required by statute, agency 
action otherwise final is final for the purposes of this section ... unless the 
agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action meanwhile 
is inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency authority. 
5 U.S.C. § 704; see also 2 CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, ITS AGENCIES, 
OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES § 6:24 (2003), Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2020) (“When 
review is sought under the general review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 
the ‘agency action’ must be ‘final agency action.’”). NHPA and NEPA do not statutorily 
require that administrative remedies be exhausted, and thus courts have discretion to hear 
claims on the merits without exhaustion of such remedies, but often do not. See, e.g., 
Winnemem Wintu Tribe v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 725 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1139 (E.D. Cal. 
2010) (“[T]o bring a claim under the APA for a violation of the NEPA, plaintiffs must show 
that they have exhausted available administrative remedies prior to bringing an action in 
federal court.”). But see Yankton Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 194 F. Supp. 
2d 977, 992 (D.S.D. 2002) (“The NHPA does not require the Tribe to exhaust its 
administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial review . . . . Thus, it is within the Court's 
discretion whether this action should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies.” (citations omitted)). 
98 See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. CV 14-1667 PSG, 
2015 WL 12659937, at *19 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 2015) (“[P]laintiffs were required to exhaust 
their administrative remedies by bringing the Santa Ynez Band's interest in the Project before 
the Corps prior to filing this lawsuit under the APA.”). 
99 Id.; see also Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384–85 (1947) (“Just as 
everyone is charged with knowledge of the United States Statutes at Large, Congress has 
provided that the appearance of rules and regulations in the Federal Register gives legal 
notice of their contents.”); Hendrick Med. Ctr. v. Azar, 950 F.3d 323, 327 (5th Cir. 2020) 
(“Hendrick received notice via the Federal Register but failed to request correction of its 
wage data by the published deadline in accordance with the established process under the 
statute. Thus, the Board’s determination that it did not have jurisdiction over Hendrick’s 
appeal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies was correct.”); Shiny Rock Mining 
Corp. v. United States, 906 F.2d 1362, 1364–65 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Publication in the Federal 
Register is legally sufficient notice to all interested or affected persons regardless of actual 
knowledge or hardship resulting from ignorance.” (citations omitted)). 




Even if tribes prove exhaustion of administrative remedies through 
appeal to consulting agencies, judicial review has limited effect. Most legal 
challenges for failure to consult fall under the Administrative Procedures 
Act.100 NEPA provides no private right of action, and therefore claims for 
failure to consult during the NEPA environmental review process must be 
brought under the APA.101 Courts are split on whether NHPA provides a 
private right of action; in more recent cases, the Ninth and D.C. Circuits have 
held that NHPA provides no private right of action and that claims for failure 
to consult during the Section 106 review process must be brought under the 
APA.102 Though beyond the scope of this Comment, tribal claims for failure 
to consult during large infrastructure project planning and permitting have 
also been brought under both the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and a 
2017 Federal Communications Commission order.103 
Under the APA, a reviewing court considering tribal claims of 
inadequate consultation under NEPA and—in most circuits—NHPA will limit 
review to whether agency consultation was arbitrary and capricious.104 This 
 
100 See Rowe, Finley & Baldwin, supra note 19, at 42–3 (describing habitual practice of tribal 
challenges to agency decisions under the APA). 
101 Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 882–83 (1990). 
102 See Shanks v. Dressel, 540 F.3d 1082, 1092 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Section 106 of the NHPA 
does not create a private right of action against the federal government.”); Karst Env’t. Educ. 
& Prot., Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.3d 1291, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“NHPA, like NEPA, contains 
no private right of action, [so] we agree with the Ninth Circuit that NHPA actions must also 
be brought pursuant to the APA.”); Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 659 F. 
Supp. 2d 1071, 1080 (D.S.D. 2009) (“I find that no private right of action was created by the 
NHPA, and therefore, this court can consider a violation of NHPA, like NEPA, only within 
the confines of the APA.”). But see Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 1017 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (“This Court, along with other courts of appeals, has recognized that federal 
question jurisdiction and a private right of action generally exists in actions arising under the 
Preservation Act.”); Bywater Neighborhood Ass’n v. Tricarico, 879 F.2d 165, 167 (5th Cir. 
1989) (“Bywater correctly observes that the NHPA expressly permits private suits outside 
the APA review process . . . .”); Brewery Dist. Soc’y v. Fed. Highway Admin., 996 F. Supp. 
750, 756 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (“Plaintiffs have a private right of action in this case against 
Defendant FHA under the NHPA to ensure compliance with the provisions of that statute.”). 
103 See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1048 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’d en 
banc, 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding Navajo, Hopi, Havasupai, and Hualapai 
Nation claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act); Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n v. FCC, 
921 F.3d 1102, 1107, 1110, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (considering though failing to reach Oceti 
Sakowin claim that FCC failed to consult as required by its own guidance document). 
104 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (stating that a reviewing court should “hold unlawful and set aside 
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”). 
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standard of review is highly deferential to agencies in interpretation of both 




NHPA’s Section 16 review process requires federal agencies to 
“consult with any Indian tribe . . . that attaches religious and cultural 
significance to property” potentially impacted by an undertaking under the 
meaning of the statute.106 Agencies must make a “reasonable and good faith 
effort” to identify potentially impacted tribes, and so long as some 
demonstrable effort was made, courts have determined that the agency is not 
at fault for failing to identify a tribe and to consult with tribe leaders.107 
Consultation requires that a potentially impacted tribe have “a reasonable 
opportunity to identify its concerns about historic properties, advise on the 
identification and evaluation of historic properties, . . . articulate its views on 
the undertaking’s effects on such properties, and participate in the resolution 
of adverse effects.”108 If the agency attempts to initiate consultation through 
direct contact—even through a form letter—and the tribe declines to respond, 
the agency has discharged its statutory and regulatory obligation to consult.109 
 
105 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984) (“Once it 
determined, after its own examination of the legislation, that Congress did not actually have 
an intent regarding the applicability of the bubble concept to the permit program, the question 
before it was not whether in its view the concept is ‘inappropriate’ in the general context of 
a program designed to improve air quality, but whether the Administrator's view that it is 
appropriate in the context of this particular program is a reasonable one.”); Auer v. Robbins, 
519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (“Because the salary-basis test is a creature of the Secretary's own 
regulations, his interpretation of it is, under our jurisprudence, controlling unless ‘plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’”).  
106 54 U.S.C. §§ 302706, 300308. 
107 See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. CV 14-1667 
PSG, 2015 WL 12659937, at *20 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 2015) (“[R]egardless of Plaintiffs’ 
failure to properly raise this issue before the Corps during the administrative process, the 
Corps satisfied its obligations under NHPA because it made a ‘reasonable and good faith 
effort to identify any Indian tribes . . . that might attach religious and cultural significance to 
historic properties in the area of potential effects’ and did not identify the Santa Ynez Band; 
therefore, the applicable regulation did not require consultation with the Santa Ynez Band.” 
(citation omitted)). 
108 36 C.F.R. § 800.2(c)(3)(i) (2019). 
109 See, e.g., United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians v. FCC, 933 F.3d 728, 749 (D.C. 
Cir. 2019) (“[I]f a Tribe refuses to respond when the Commission requests its views on an 
application, the Commission has discharged its obligation of direct Commission-to-Tribe 
consultation.”); San Juan Citizens All. v. Norton, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1292 (D.N.M. 2008) 
(“BLM sent letters to 51 different tribal governments and 29 other tribal officials to inform 
them of the project and to seek their input on concerns and issues BLM should consider 
during the planning process . . . . BLM sent copies of the draft RMP and EIS as well as the 
proposed RMP and Final EIS to all tribal entities that requested copies.”). 




Though it should be noted that mere contact between agency and tribe is not 
sufficient for Section 106 consultation, reviewing courts generally require 
only that consultation constitute some form of individualized discussion 
between the tribe and the agency.110 This discussion may take many forms, 
including listening sessions, conference calls, or remote or in-person 
meetings.111 Consultation may be generalized and need not involve 
discussion of every installation or site.112 Likewise, consultation need not 
involve every chapter of large tribes.113 Despite the regulatory directive to begin 
consulting early in the Section 106 process, delayed consultation just prior to 
project approval has not been found to be arbitrary and capricious.114 In Walsh 
 
110 See, e.g., Quechan Tribe of Fort Yuma Indian Rsrv. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 755 F. 
Supp. 2d 1104, 1118–19 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (“BLM's invitation to ‘consult,’ then, amounted to 
little more than a general request for the Tribe to gather its own information about all sites 
within the area and disclose it at public meetings. Because of the lack of information, it was 
impossible for the Tribe to have been consulted meaningful as required in applicable 
regulations.”). But see, e.g., United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians, 933 F.3d at 746 
(“[I]nitial contact will lead to voluntary direct discussions through which applicants and 
tribes . . . will resolve questions involving the presence of relevant historic properties and 
effects on such properties . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
111 United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians, 933 F.3d at 750–51. 
112 See, e.g., Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp. 3d 4, 33 
(D.D.C. 2016) (“The Tribe . . . did not have an absolute right to participate in cultural surveying 
at every permitted undertaking, as it seems to argue. The Advisory Council regulations direct 
the agency to ‘take into account past planning, research, and studies’ in making these types of 
determinations, and that is just what the Corps did here. It gave the Tribe a reasonable and 
good-faith opportunity to identify sites of importance to it.” (citation omitted)). 
113 See, e.g., San Juan Citizens All., 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1293 (“Simply because BLM chose 
to consult with individual Navajo Chapters in other cases does not demonstrate that it was 
legally obligated to consult all Chapters in all situations.”). 
114 See, e.g., Quechan Tribe of Fort Yuma Indian Rsrv. v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 927 F. 
Supp. 2d 921, 933 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (“[N]o request for meetings by the Tribe was made or 
initiated until December 2011. Once the first meeting was held on January 31, 2012, 
subsequent monthly meetings were held [over the three months until permit approval . . . . 
Therefore, the Court concludes that the BLM did not fail to adequately conduct Section 106 
consultations.”). Note that any delay in tribal communication of concerns until after approval 
of a federal undertaking has not prompted a finding of inadequate consultation: 
[W]e think it would undermine the policies behind the laches doctrine, as 
well as the justifications for requiring an agency to conduct additional 
NHPA review when previously undiscovered cultural resources are 
identified, to treat the asserted violation of this “ongoing” duty in this case 
as distinct from the claim that the original section 106 process was 
defective for the purposes of determining inexcusable delay. Had the Tribe 
participated in the process, the Coalition could not now claim that the 
information that it subsequently brought to the Forest Service's attention 
was “new.” Indeed, a contrary result would give parties that an agency 
seeks to consult under NHPA incentives not to participate in the process: 
even if the agency would, after appropriate consideration of the 
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v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the court found that the Bureau of Land 
Management satisfied its Section 106 consultation requirement even though it 
issued the development permit before concluding its meetings with Plaintiffs.115  
Failure of agencies to consult beyond an initial discussion has not 
been considered arbitrary and capricious by reviewing courts. Should the 
parties disagree on the potential adverse impact an undertaking will have on 
a property of historic, religious, or cultural significance, the agency is 
nonetheless free to follow its own conclusions and proceed with project 
approval and construction.116 NHPA “only requires that an agency take 
procedural steps to identify cultural resources; it does not impose a 
substantive mandate on the agency to protect the resources.”117 After the 
programmatic agreement is signed for a given project, the drafting agency 
has discharged its Section 106 obligations, even to a tribe that does not sign 




NEPA environmental review requires consideration of environmental 
impact on cultural resources which, at least in part, must involve consultation 
with potentially adversely impacted tribes.119 Consultation in the process of 
environmental assessment must involve a “full and fair discussion” of the 
potential effects of the project on impacted resources.120 This is part of the 
broader requirement that, to comply with NEPA, federal agencies take a 
“hard look” at the environmental impacts of any planned action.121 This “hard 
 
information, go forward with the project, an entity such as the Tribe could 
hold back some evidence of the existence of cultural resources until after the 
project had been approved, and then receive a second bite at the apple . . . .  
Apache Survival Coal. v. United States, 21 F.3d 895, 912 (9th Cir. 1994). 
115 757 F. Supp. 781, 786–89 (W.D. Tex. 1990). 
116 See, e.g., United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians, 933 F.3d at 746 (“‘[I]f an 
applicant and an Indian tribe . . . disagree regarding whether an undertaking will have an 
adverse effect on a historic property of religious and cultural significance, or if the tribe . . . 
does not respond to the applicant’s inquiries,’ the Commission steps in to consult and 
ultimately ‘make a decision regarding the proposed undertaking.’” (citation omitted)). 
117 San Juan Citizens All., 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1294. 
118 See generally Battle Mountain Band v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 3:16-cv-0268-
LRH-WGC, 2016 WL 4497756 (D. Nev. Aug. 26, 2016). 
119 36 C.F.R. § 800.8 (2019). 
120 Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National 
Environmental Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 43,304, 43,363, 43,366 (July 16, 2020) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.1, 1502.16). 
121 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) (citation omitted). 




look” does not impose a duty to reach particular results or to follow outside—
including tribal—recommendations.122  
Courts reviewing tribe-agency consultation on the environmental 
impacts on cultural resources require consideration of all identified resources 
but no particular quality of consultation or level of deference to tribal 
concerns.123 Consultation may be generalized and need not involve 
discussion of every installation or site.124 An agency’s environmental 
assessment may consider impacts on specific historic sites identified by tribes 
but not on surrounding areas. This is exemplified in South Fork Band Council 
v. U.S. Department of the Interior, where the Bureau of Land Management 
claimed its environmental impact statement satisfied Plaintiffs’ concerns in 
arranging for access to specific sacred sites but not to the entire mountain on 
which those sites were located, despite reference to the entire mountain’s 
significance in consultation records.125 As with tribe-agency engagement 
under NHPA, timely consultation may involve agency contact as little as one 
month before publishing its environmental assessment or environmental 
impact statement.126 
 
C. Legislative Oversight 
 
Third, consultation fails because Congress defers to agencies in 
creating their own nonbinding policies and Congressional oversight neglects 
to protect tribal interests. Congress has oversight mechanisms at its disposal 
for conducting inquiry into agency action and policy, but so long as 
authorizing statutes direct agencies to engage in consultation—
fundamentally a discretionary, nonbinding form of tribe-agency 
engagement—there is no incentive for agency change. 
 
 
122 Id.; see also Navajo Nation v. Dep't of the Interior, 876 F.3d 1144, 1158 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(“The Department does not believe this proposed action would preclude the Tribes or any 
entitlement holder from using their Colorado River entitlement. The interim surplus criteria 
will not alter the quantity or priority of Tribal entitlements.”). 
123 See, e.g., Indigenous Env’t Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 347 F. Supp. 3d 561, 590 (D. 
Mont. 2018) (holding that the Department of State’s environmental impact statement needed 
to include a survey of potential cultural resources impacted, but not requiring any additional 
action or specifying the means of tribal consultation). 
124 See, e.g., Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env't v. Jewell, 312 F. Supp. 3d 1031, 1107–
08 (D.N.M. 2018) (“A SHPO consultation is thus not mandatory for every well, but only for 
wells that the BLM Field Manager is considering expanding the APE. Accordingly, the 
BLM's failure to consult the SHPO for every well does not, by itself, demonstrate that the 
BLM acted contrary to law or arbitrarily and capriciously.”). 
125 588 F.3d 718, 724 (9th Cir. 2009). 
126 See, e.g., Te-Moak Tribe of W. Shoshone of Nev. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 608 F.3d 592, 
608–09 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that the BLM met its NEPA consultation requirement despite 
waiting a full year after the developer applied for an amendment to mining plans to contact the tribe).  
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1. Oversight through the Government Accountability Office 
 
After tensions between the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, Dakota 
Access, and authorizing federal agencies spilled over into physical 
confrontation and extensive litigation in the federal courts, 26 members of 
Congress asked the GAO to produce a report on federal agencies’ procedures 
for consulting with tribes about major infrastructure projects.127 An “arm of 
Congress . . . totally independent of the executive,” GAO acts as a mechanism 
for congressional oversight.128 GAO is charged by statute with “evaluat[ing] 
the results of a program or activity the Government carries out under existing 
law” when asked to do so by a congressional committee.129 In this case, 
twenty-two members of the House of Representatives, and leaders of the 
House Subcommittee for Indigenous Peoples of the United States, House 
Committee on Natural Resources, Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, and 
Senate Committee on the Budget commissioned the GAO in September 2016 
to inquire into the consultation policies of twenty-one agencies.130 Following 
their investigation, the GAO identified a series of barriers to consultation 
identified by agency officials and tribal governments, and subsequently made 
twenty recommendations to seventeen agencies, two recommendations to the 
FPISC, and one request for congressional consideration.131 Agencies that 
responded to GAO recommendations generally agreed with the Office’s 
suggestions and expressed commitment to revisiting consultation policies.132 
The GAO Report serves as a useful tool for identifying problems with tribe-
agency consultation but lacks teeth as an enforcement mechanism. 
Unfortunately, GAO findings are not binding upon agencies or upon Congress, 
and their opinions are only persuasive authority in federal courts.133  
 
2. Oversight through congressional hearings 
 
Congress also exercises oversight over tribe-agency consultation in 
holding committee hearings. Since 2016, Congress has held countless 
hearings referencing both the Standing Rock conflict and the need for 
effective tribe-agency consultation in general. 
First, the House Subcommittee on Energy held a hearing on Standing 
Rock to provide an information-sharing platform for both Standing Rock 
 
127 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 16, at 2, 67–68. 
128 7 CHARLES H. KOCH, WEST’S FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE § 7909 (1999), 
Westlaw (database updated July 2020). 
129 31 U.S.C. § 717. 
130 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 16, at 2, 67–68. 
131 Id. at 57–59. 
132 Id. at 60–65. 
133 KOCH, supra note 128, § 7909. 




Sioux Tribe council and Energy Transfer Partners to share their thoughts on 
the breakdown in consultation.134 More recently, the House Subcommittee on 
Indigenous Peoples held a hearing on the role of tribal consultation under 
NHPA and other federal laws for protection of tribal resources impacted by 
construction of the border wall between the United States and Mexico; 
committee members heard testimony from a representative of the Department 
of the Interior, a construction consultant, a representative from the Tohono 
O’odham Nation in Arizona, and two scholars with expertise on tribal 
resources and the consultation process.135  
Second, in the wake of this increased publicity on agency consultation 
failures, agencies have also been called before congressional committees to 
give testimony on consultation policies. In February 2017 Alex Amparo, then 
Assistant Administrator for the Department of Homeland Security, appeared 
before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs to provide testimony on 
consultation policy improvements adopted by FEMA, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency.136  
Third, consultation is regularly raised in the course of appropriations 
hearings. For fiscal years 2018, 2019, and 2020, House appropriations 
hearings for Energy, Water Development, Agriculture, Rural Development, 
the FDA, Interior, and Environment all involved discussion of tribe-agency 
consultation.137 
 
134 Modernizing Energy and Electricity Delivery Systems: Challenges and Opportunities to 
Promote Infrastructure Improvement and Expansion: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy 
of the H. Comm. on Energy & Com., 115th Cong. 142–46, 167–72 (2017) (statements of Chad 
Harrison, Councilman At-Large, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, and Joey Mahmoud, Executive 
Vice President and Project Executive, Dakota Access Pipeline, Energy Transfer Partners). 
135 Destroying Sacred Sites and Erasing Tribal Culture: The Trump Administration’s 
Construction of the Border Wall: Hearing Before the Subcomm. for Indigenous Peoples of 
the U.S. of the H. Comm. on Nat. Res., 116th Cong. (2020) (statements of Scott Cameron, 
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy, Management, & Budget, U.S. Dep’t of the 
Interior, Steve Hodapp, Independent Contractor & Environmental Specialist, Ned Norris, Jr., 
Chairman, the Tohono O’odham Nation, Sarah Krakoff, Moses Lasky Professor of Law, 
University of Colorado Law School, and Shannon Keller O’Loughlin, Executive Director, 
Association on American Indian Affairs).  
136 Emergency Management in Indian Country: Improving FEMA’s Federal Tribal 
Relationship with Indian Tribes: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs., 115th Cong. 
5–11 (2017) (statement of Alex Amparo, Assistant Administrator for Recovery, Office of 
Response and Recovery, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security). 
137 Energy and Water Development Appropriations for 2018, Part 1B: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Energy, Water Dev. and Related Agencies Appropriation of the H. Comm. on 
Appropriations, 115th Cong. 251 (2017); Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug 
Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2018, Part 1C: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Agriculture, Rural Development, FDA and Related Agencies Appropriations 
of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 115th Cong. 223 (2017); Interior, Environment, and 
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Consideration of the tribe-agency consultation relationship in 
committee hearings is—at least facially—encouraging. Committee hearings 
may play an “information-forcing agency oversight” role in shining a light 
on inadequate agency procedure.138 The problem with expecting this 
information-forcing to result in change is that, in the face of vague statutes 
and the understanding that consultation policy is nonbinding, hearing 
oversight lacks the force to change agency priorities. As Christopher Walker 
writes in his article on legislative impact on the administrative state, 
Congress often uses hearings, information requests, 
investigations, audits, and so forth to compete with the other 
branches of government in the public sphere. But if Congress 
does not also use these oversight tools to regularly pass laws, 
I fear the legitimacy of the toolbox is called into question. 
Without the threat of legislative action, moreover, the efficacy 
of this toolbox in influencing agency action is severely 
diminished. These fears are heightened when members of 
Congress, or congressional committees, use these oversight 
tools to extract policy outcomes from federal agencies that are 
contrary to the wishes of the collective Congress.139 
Providing a platform for sharing insights and experiences about tribe-agency 





Related Agencies Appropriations for 2018, Part 3A: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations of the H. Comm. on 
Appropriations, 115th Cong. 11, 36 (2017); Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies 
Appropriations for 2019, Part 7: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Interior, Environment, 
and Related Agencies Appropriations of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 115th Cong. 34, 
158–59, 171, 198, 207, 281, 292, 317, 375, 424 (2018); Interior, Environment, and Related 
Agencies Appropriations for 2020, Part 7: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Interior, 
Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 
116th Cong. 124–25 (2019); Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug 
Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2020, Part 1C: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Agriculture, Rural Development, FDA and Related Agencies Appropriations 
of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 116th Cong. 192 (2019); Energy and Water 
Development Appropriations for 2020, Part 1B: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy, 
Water Development, and Related Agencies Appropriation of the H. Comm. on 
Appropriations, 116th Cong. 71, 280 (2019). 
138 See Catherine M. Sharkey, State Farm “With Teeth”: Heightened Judicial Review in the 
Absence of Executive Oversight, 89 NYU L. REV. 1589, 1657–59 (2014) (describing the 
information forcing role of congressional hearings, inspector general audits, and GAO 
investigations in the SEC context). 
139 Christopher J. Walker, Restoring Congress's Role in the Modern Administrative State, 
116 MICH. L. REV. 1101, 1120 (2018). 




3. Continued use of the consultation device 
 
Despite Congress’ inadequacy to police tribe-agency consultation and 
widespread dissatisfaction with consultation as an engagement device, 
Congress continues to draft statutes with consultation requirements. During 
the four years from April 2016 through March 2020, Congress enacted 
twenty-eight public laws creating new tribal consultation requirements.140 
 
140 The twenty-eight public laws enacted between April 2016 and March 2020 are as follows: 
1. Integrated Public Alert and Warning System Modernization Act of 2015, Pub. L. 
No. 114-143, § 526, 130 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 3210). 
2. Native American Children’s Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 114-165, § 2, 130 Stat. 415 
(2016) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3201, 3207). 
3. Native American Tourism and Improving Visitor Experience Act, Pub. L. No. 114-
221, § 4, 133 Stat. 847 (2016) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 4353). 
4. 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 6002, 133 Stat. 1033 (2016) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 290aa). 
5. Federal Property Management Reform Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-318, § 623, 
130 Stat. 1608 (codified at 40 U.S.C. § 623). 
6. Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-322, §§ 
1120, 3225, 4004, 130 Stat. 1628 (2016) (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 16, 25, and 33 U.S.C.). 
7. Weather Research and Forecasting Innovation Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-25, §§ 
201, 412, 131 Stat. 91 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 313, 8548). 
8. Indian Employment, Training and Related Services Consolidation Act of 2017, Pub. 
L. No. 115-93, §§ 7, 15, 131 Stat. 2026 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 3406). 
9. Law Enforcement Mental Health and Wellness Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-113, 
§§ 2, 4, 131 Stat. 2276 (codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. §§ 10101, 10381, 50101). 
10. John S. McCain III, Daniel K. Akaka, and Samuel R. Johnson VA Maintaining 
Internal Systems and Strengthening Integrated Outside Networks Act of 2018; VA 
MISSION Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-182, § 209, 132 Stat. 1393 (codified as 
amended at 38 U.S.C. § 8122). 
11. Strengthening Career and Technical Education for the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. 
No. 115-224, §§ 112, 122, 133, 219, 132 Stat. 1563 (2018) (codified as amended at 
20 U.S.C. §§ 2323, 2342, 2354, 2399). 
12. America’s Water Infrastructure Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-270, §§ 1129, 1214, 
132 Stat. 3765 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 7020, 2232). 
13. Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment 
for Patients and Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 115-271, § 7031, 132 Stat. 3894 
(2018) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 290ee-5). 
14. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-
278, § 2202, 132 Stat. 4168 (2018) (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 652). 
15. Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act Amendments of 
2017, Pub. L. No. 115-325, §§ 101–03, 132 Stat. 4445 (codified as amended at 25 
U.S.C. §§ 3502–04). 
16. Endangered Salmon Predation Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 115-329, § 3, 132 Stat. 
4475 (2018) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1389). 
17. Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-334, § 4003, 132 Stat. 4624 
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2012–13). 
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Though infrastructure-impacting legislation is somewhat disproportionately 
represented, consultation requirements were also codified in legislation 
related to health care, criminal justice, agriculture, and education. 
Codification of consultation as a means of engagement between federal 
agencies and tribes explicitly sanctions current policies and implicitly denies 
that consultation as a device is at the root of conflict between agencies and 
tribes in and out of court. Congressional action creating consultation 
obligations undermines any positive effects flowing from congressional 
oversight through GAO investigations and congressional hearings. In fact, 
continued use of consultation in federal statutes actively privileges a model 
of tribe-agency engagement that cannot work and that directly contravenes 
the spirit of executive orders and memoranda requiring respect for 
sovereignty of tribes potentially impacted by large infrastructure projects.  
 
III. RADICAL NONCOMPLIANCE DICTATES THE NEED FOR NEW 
ENGAGEMENT DEVICES 
 
In the face of consultation’s inadequacy, Congress must employ 
different engagement devices to facilitate tribe-agency engagement in a 
manner respectful of tribal sovereignty. The frequency with which Congress 
uses consultation requirements suggests that the device has been successful, 
but the historical record tells a different story. Below, I suggest possible paths 
forward by exploring alternative engagement mechanisms with the potential 
 
18. Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-385, § 201, 132 Stat. 5123 
(codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. § 11114). 
19. Ashanti Alert Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-401, §§ 203–04, 132 Stat. 5336 
(codified at 34 U.S.C. § 21903–04). 
20. Johnson-O’Malley Supplemental Indian Education Program Modernization Act, 
Pub. L. No. 115-404, § 7, 132 Stat. 5349 (2018) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. 
§ 5348). 
21. Museum and Library Services Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-410, § 210, 132 Stat. 
5412 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 9108). 
22. Foundations for Evidence-Based Policymaking Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-435, 
§ 312, 132 Stat. 5529 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 312). 
23. John D. Dingell, Jr. Conservation, Management, and Recreation Act, Pub. L. No. 
116-9, § 1111, 133 Stat. 580 (2019) (codified at 54 U.S.C. § 320301). 
24. Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness and Advancing Information Act of 2019, 
Pub. L. No. 116-22, § 210, 133 Stat. 905 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 234). 
25. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92, § 
2802, 133 Stat. 1198 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 2802). 
26. Columbia River In-Lieu and Treaty Fishing Access Sites Improvement Act, Pub. L. 
No. 116-99, §§ 2–3, 133 Stat. 3254 (2019). 
27. Grant Reporting Efficiency and Agreements Transparency Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 
116-103, § 6402–03, 133 Stat. 3266 (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 6402–03). 
28. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 
601, 134 Stat. 281 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 801). 




to succeed where consultation has failed. First, a better engagement device 
should require agencies to make binding policy with attendant administrative 
protections to impacted tribes. Second, a better device should promote more 
rigorous judicial review while decreasing litigation.141 Third, it should permit 
greater congressional scrutiny.142 
Existing federal Indian law provides a spectrum of alternative 
engagement devices that better satisfy the above criteria: [1] negotiated 
rulemaking; [2] formal adjudication; [3] negotiation and compact; and [4] 
consent. Each of these is preferable to the current system of “box-checking” 
consultation in providing more robust oversight and protection for tribes. No 
single alternative device is appropriate in the universal way Congress insists 
consultation can work; each alternative operates well in some circumstances 
but not in others. There are also likely many more alternatives available. In 
creating law, Congress must intentionally evaluate the needs of engagement in 
 
141 Legally binding policies with clear imposition of rights owed regulated parties and duties 
owed by agencies would allow reviewing courts to consider APA procedural requirements 
(thus tying the requirement of more rigorous judicial review to the requirement of additional 
administrative procedure). More explicit statutes directing agencies to engage in rulemaking or 
adjudication would also ground more engaged arbitrary and capricious review, if for no other 
reason than that the court would have a detailed record of agency action to consider. William 
Funk, A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1321, 1339–40, 1343–44 (2001).  
Alternatively, reframing the tribe-agency engagement process as an adjudication—
or as having sufficient adjudicatory qualities—would allow reviewing courts to consider due 
process requirements. Compare Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) (holding that due 
process protections are only applicable to government agency activities that are adjudicative 
in nature) with Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) 
(holding that due process protections are applicable to administrative activities where a small 
number of people is exceptionally impacted, while rule-making activities impacting many 
people do not trigger due process protections). See also Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, 
Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 886 (2007) (“[T]he procedural 
due process protections we associate with adjudicatory hearings do not apply to agency 
rulemakings any more than they apply to actions of legislators; that has been the understood 
import of Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization for nearly a century.”). 
A superior engagement device would also spur less litigation initiated by tribes, not 
because of any limitation in access to courts, but because of increased satisfaction in the 
tribe-agency engagement process. The more equitable the balance of power between tribe 
and agency, the less likely it is that tribes will need to seek recourse in the federal courts. 
142 Nonbinding policymaking more easily evades congressional review; for example, 
guidance documents and other forms of nonbinding rules are routinely subject to less 
congressional oversight than are binding rules. Stephen M. Johnson, In Defense of the Short 
Cut, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 495, 508 (2012); Jessica Mantel, Procedural Safeguards for Agency 
Guidance: A Source of Legitimacy for the Administrative State, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 343, 381 
(2009). If Congress passed laws requiring agencies to engage in binding rulemaking or 
adjudication, it would be more feasible for traditional methods of congressional oversight to 
evaluate the adequacy of agency fulfilment of their statutory duties. For example, the 
Congressional Review Act allows Congress to issue a joint resolution of disapproval for 
binding rules it wishes to overturn. 5 U.S.C. § 801. 
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each statute and evaluate which device will best maximize benefits and 
decrease harms. 
 
A. Negotiated Rulemaking 
 
Negotiated rulemaking incorporates a consultation model but requires 
by statute that agencies develop binding consultation rules through 
negotiation with tribal representatives. Executive Order 13,175 specifically 
named negotiated rulemaking as one possible device for promulgating 
binding consultation policies.143 Agencies adopted negotiated rulemaking in 
the 1980s as an alternative to the fundamentally adversarial formal 
rulemaking process.144 Congress passed the Negotiated Rulemaking Act in 
1990, providing a framework for negotiated rulemaking that would still 
conform with APA Section 553.145 In negotiated rulemaking, the 
promulgating agency creates a committee of representatives from impacted 
organizations and agencies; in this case, representatives from tribal 
governments would be important committee members.146 The committee 
meets, with discussion on the record, to negotiate a proposed rule; consensus 
on the proposal means that proposed rule then goes on to be subject to the 
APA’s notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures.147 Theoretically, this 
would permit tribes to specify the consultation practices that would be most 
meaningful to them. “If the committee does not reach a consensus on a 
proposed rule, the committee may transmit to the agency a report specifying 
any areas in which the committee reached a consensus.”148 The agency then 
may use the report in writing the proposed rule itself.149 In most cases, 
agencies engaging in negotiated rulemaking do so by choice and out of 
statutory obligation.150 
 
143 Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249, 67,251 (Nov. 9, 2000). 
144 Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated 
Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1263–64 (1997). 
145 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–70. 
146 Coglianese, supra note 144, at 1256–57. 
147 Id. at 1257; 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). 
148 5 U.S.C. § 566. 
149 1 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR. & RICHARD MURPHY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & PRACTICE § 4:36 
(3d ed. 2010), Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2020). 
150 David Thaw, Enlightened Regulatory Capture, 29 WASH. L. REV. 329, 341 (2014). Here, 
Congress would need to require negotiated rulemaking. The Department of the Interior has 
a consultation policy that leaves the decision as to whether to employ consultation, 
negotiated rulemaking, or “other collaborative approach” to agency officials. That there is 
little evidence that DOI employs negotiated rulemaking in formulating policy with tribes is 
perhaps not surprising given this discretion. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, POLICY ON 
CONSULTATION WITH INDIAN TRIBES, supra note 84, at 10, 12. 




 Negotiated rulemaking with tribal committee members is already in 
place in some agencies. Congress currently requires that the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the Department of Transportation, 
the Department of the Interior, the Department of Health and Human Services, 
and the Department of Education engage in negotiated rulemaking procedures 
for specific regulations under a series of Native American Self-Determination 
Acts impacting funding allocation and distribution.151 
Scholars’ evaluations of negotiated rulemaking suggest it may be a 
viable alternative to nonbinding consultation policy. While several 
commentators are of the opinion that negotiated rulemaking is largely 
unsuccessful,152 some of these concerns are rooted in the theory that 
negotiated rulemaking prioritizes private interests of the parties involved over 
public needs.153 But if tribes are both the participating parties and the 
impacted parties, this criticism suggests that negotiated rulemaking may be 
particularly well-suited for tribe-agency consultation. In fact, David Thaw 
cites implementation of the No Child Left Behind Act for schools funded by 
the Bureau of Indian Affairs as one of three noted successes of negotiated 
rulemaking, though there is no evidence of “success” beyond the fact that the 
process did yield regulations.154  
With negotiated rulemaking’s success defined as any process 
resulting in a rule, it is best suited to tribe-agency engagement over projects 
with relatively low impact on the general public. In the absence of consensus, 
the backstop procedure is the typical notice-and-comment rulemaking 
process, meaning that tribal priorities and concerns may not be considered if 
overwhelmed by a large volume of public comments. It should be noted, 
however, that even notice-and-comment rulemaking without consensus 
would offer administrative procedural protections that exceed those offered 
by a consultation model. 
 
B. Adversarial Administrative Adjudication 
 
Unlike the implementation of negotiated rulemaking, a second 
alternative engagement device would completely eliminate consultation in 
favor of an administrative adjudication between the agency and the 
potentially impacted tribe. The process by which an agency seeking to 
approve a large infrastructure project approaches a tribe potentially impacted 
 
151 25 U.S.C. §§ 4116, 5328, 5367, 5397; 23 U.S.C. § 207. 
152 See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of 
Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1334–35 (1997) (suggesting that negotiated 
rulemaking produces neither better rules nor less post hoc litigation). 
153 William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory Negotiation and the 
Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351, 1386 (1997). 
154 Thaw, supra note 150, at 345–47. 
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under NHPA and NEPA is an assessment of tribal and agency rights and 
duties, suggesting it may be considered an inherently adversarial and 
adjudicatory process.155 In adjudication, administrative decision-making 
involves the application of preexisting standards to individualized facts, 
leading to the resolution of an individualized controversy or complaint.156 
Significantly, adjudications can still involve declarations of policy, while 
rulemaking may also have a quasi-adjudicative or “quasi-judicial” 
component; there is no bright line rule between the two categories as the APA 
might suggest.157 Licensing and permitting are two common administrative 
proceedings that have a somewhat hybrid nature but are nevertheless 
considered adjudications for APA purposes.158 The rulemaking-adjudication 
distinction is still significant, as different APA procedural protections 
accompany adjudications and rulemakings, with further differentiation based 
on whether the proceedings are formal or informal as defined by the APA.159  
Whether an adjudication is formal or informal will impact several 
factors, including whether the adjudication must be on the record, the 
impartiality required of the factfinder, the required statement of findings and 
conclusions, the evidence considered, and whether there is a requirement of 
right to cross-examination.160 Equally significant is the requirement that, in 
adjudications or other “quasi-judicial” proceedings, agencies must accord due 
process protections to the complaining party.161 “Procedural due process 
imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of 
‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.”162 Due process protections are not fixed in 
nature but are a function of the private and government interests at stake and the 
“risk of erroneous deprivation” of the private interest in a given dispute.163 
It would not be unreasonable to classify tribe-agency engagement 
over a proposed large infrastructure project as an adversarial administrative 
adjudication. An agency decisionmaker would apply NHPA and NEPA 
statutory and regulatory guidelines to the particular concerns of potentially 
impacted tribes in light of a particular proposed infrastructure project. The 
 
155 KOCH, supra note 128, at § 7305. 
156 Id. 
157 Id.  
158 5 U.S.C. § 551. 
159 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (codifying procedural requirements for rulemaking, including 
requirement that the rulemaking be “on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing”); 5 
U.S.C. § 554, 556–57 (codifying procedural requirements for adjudications, including 
requirements for formal adjudications “on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing”). 
160 Id. §§ 554–57. 
161 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 542 
(1978); United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. 410 U.S. 224, 244–45 (1973). 
162 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). 
163 Id. 




decisionmaker would evaluate and determine prospective tribal rights and 
agency duties that must be guaranteed for the project to go forward. Derek 
Haskew makes a persuasive argument for classifying the tribe-agency 
engagement process as an administrative adjudication.164 Haskew points out 
that both consultations and adjudications involve specific parties with adverse 
interests and can substantially impact use of tribal assets.165 That tribes and 
federal agencies meet to consult as historic adversaries is undeniable.166 
 Would additional APA and constitutional procedural protections 
offered by formal (or informal) adjudication make for a superior process? In 
a formal adjudication, the APA would provide tribes with a hearing on the 
record, including the timely notice of that hearing, the opportunity to submit 
facts and arguments and to call witnesses, relative guarantees of the 
impartiality of the presiding official, and the ability to rebut agency evidence 
and to conduct cross-examination as needed. Even if Congress determined 
via statute that these adjudications would be informal, judge-made 
determinations on the requirements of due process—given tribal property 
interests and the high deprivation risks of approving infrastructure projects 
without engagement with impacted tribes—may provide just as much 
process, including an in-person hearing.167 
Adjudication would be best suited to tribe-agency engagement 
between relatively few parties. When several tribes’ interests are at stake, the 
fundamentally bi-polar administrative process would struggle to account for 
the priorities of all sovereigns. But when a small number of tribes must 
engage with federal agencies on a major project, adjudication provides clear 
benefits. The opportunity to engage in a procedurally complex adversarial 
proceeding against the agency, for proper determination of the steps that 
would be required to protect tribal interests before and during infrastructure 
development, would clearly provide better procedural protections. The role 
of Congress in statutorily recognizing tribal interests and in creating specific 
requirements for implementing agencies would likewise make true 
congressional oversight more feasible. And an adjudicative process would 
provide both more meaningful judicial review of the adjudicative decision 
and less litigation in the form of appeals to the federal courts (or at least less 
litigation than the current system engenders, given the lack of a forum for 





164 Haskew, supra note 78, at 69–70, 73–74. 
165 Id. at 69. 
166 Tanana & Ruple, supra note 74, at 47. 
167 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556–57. 
           Journal of Law and Public Affairs       [March 2021 
 
   
 
596 
C. Negotiation and Compact 
 
The negotiation and compact model required by the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act (IGRA) provides a third alternative engagement device. 
IGRA requires that Class III gaming on tribal lands within a state must be 
“conducted in conformance with a Tribal-state compact entered into by the 
Indian Tribe and the State.”168 If a tribe wishing to open a gaming facility on 
its lands requests that the state enter into a negotiation and compact process, 
the state must do so, and negotiate in good faith.169 A tribal-state compact 
takes effect once approved by the Secretary of the Department of the 
Interior.170 If the state fails to negotiate in good faith, the tribe may file suit 
against the state in federal court and ask the court to make a finding as to the 
state’s good faith effort.171 A finding of bad faith forces the parties to create 
a proposal within 60 days or, failing that, to submit to mediation to attempt 
to reconcile and create a compact.172 If the state refuses to waive sovereign 
immunity and consent to the suit, the tribe may alone submit a gaming 
proposal to the Secretary, giving the state sixty days to accept or to submit its 
own counter-proposal.173 If the state does advance its own proposal, the 
Secretary sends the parties to mediation to reconcile the two proposals.174 The 
Secretary then either accepts the mediator’s consolidated proposal or 
advances an alternate proposal within another sixty day period.175 
Compacts place a great deal of discretion in the hands of the Secretary 
of the Interior, making the negotiation and compact process an effective 
alternative device for Congress in situations where the Secretary can be a good 
arbiter of competing interests. In circumstances where there is, for example, a 
conflict of interest, federal courts act as the backstop for resolving tribe-agency 
disputes, and a judicial finding of bad faith triggers a mediation process that 
parallels the mediation following from a good faith negotiation that fails to 
reach consensus.176 Use of negotiated compacts as an engagement device 
 
168 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1). Class III gaming includes slot machines, table casino games, and 
lotteries. Id. § 2703(8). 
169 Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A). 
170 Id. § 2710(d)(3)(B). 
171 Id. § 2710(d)(7). 
172 Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii-iv). Note that failure to reach a compact does not imply necessary 
bad faith by the state, though courts have often found that there cannot be bad faith when the 
parties did enter into a compact. Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 511 (5th Cir. 2007); 
Pauma Band of Luiseno Mission Indians of Pauma & Yuima Rsrv. v. California, 813 F.3d 
1155, 1172 (9th Cir. 2015). 
173 25 C.F.R. §§ 291.1(b), 291.3, 291.7 (2019). 
174 Id. §§ 291.9, 291.10. 
175 Id. § 291.11. 
176 Id. 




would be inappropriate in circumstances where, in the past, tribes have been 
dissatisfied with the Secretary’s balancing of tribe and agency interests.177 
IGRA’s mechanism was specifically implemented with an eye to 
respecting “the basic principle that the states and tribes negotiate as 
sovereigns.”178 The Senate Committee Report accompanying the original 
Senate bill stated that “the use of compacts between tribes and states is the 
best mechanism to assure that the interests of both sovereign entities are met 
with respect to the regulation of complex gaming enterprises . . . .”179 
Compacts offer further benefits: a statute providing for negotiation and 
compact must necessarily also provide relatively robust procedures as to 
initiation of negotiation and for solutions in the event that negotiations break 
down, and mediation is a helpful backstop to protect tribal interests. When 
the Secretary of the Interior can and does balance federal and tribal interests, 
the negotiation and compact model may be the best device for considering 




A final alternative engagement device is the requirement of tribal 
consent.  
Substantial secondary literature exists urging Congress to adopt the 
“free, prior, and informed consent” model incorporated in the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.180 The UN Declaration 
emphasis on good faith engagement and on securing consent prior to taking 
state action that may impact tribes is more in line with the spirit of Executive 
 
177 See Kevin Gover & Tom Gede, The States as Trespassers in a Federal-Tribal 
Relationship: A Historical Critique of Tribal-State Compacting Under IGRA, 42 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 185, 216 (2010) (arguing that the negotiation and compact model “has forced an uneasy 
and often litigious relationship between states and tribes with mixed results, skewed 
incentives, and often unfavorable consequences”); In re Indian Gaming Related Cases, 331 
F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Given that class III gaming can be ‘a source of substantial 
revenue for the Indian tribes and a significant rival for traditional private sector gaming 
facilities,’ its regulation ‘has been the most controversial part of IGRA and the subject of 
considerable litigation between various Indian tribes and the states.’”). 
178 Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 770 F. Supp. 
480, 481 (W.D. Wis. 1991). 
179 S. REP. NO. 100-446, at 13 (1988). 
180 For examples of literature urging adoption of the UN model, see Fredericks, supra note 
68; Stuart R. Butzier & Sarah M. Stevenson, Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to Sacred Sites and 
Traditional Cultural Properties and the Role of Consultation and Free, Prior, and Informed 
Consent, 32 J. ENERGY & NAT. RES. L. 297 (2014); Robert J. Miller, Consultation or 
Consent: The United States’ Duty to Confer with American Indian Governments, 91 N.D. L. 
REV. 37 (2015); Tarah Bailey, Consultation with American Indian Tribes: Resolving 
Ambiguity and Inconsistency in Government-to-Government Relations, 29 COLO. NAT. RES. 
ENERGY & ENV’T L. REV. 195 (2018). 
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Order 13,175 and its emphasis on sovereign-to-sovereign interaction. 
Complicating any recommendation that Congress adopt the UN’s standard, 
however, is that it is not binding on the United States, and much more 
significantly, that when the United States finally voted in favor of the 
declaration three years after it was passed by the UN General Assembly, it 
was with the clear caveat that the executive branch saw no conflict between 
the declaration and current federal agency consultation policies.181 It is 
infeasible to recommend that Congress adopt a standard of international 
customary law with an eye to effecting change in the processes and 
safeguards in the tribe-agency engagement process when the executive 
branch has already decided the standard effects no change at all. 
Notwithstanding these concerns, consent is a viable alternative 
engagement device already grounded in federal Indian law. Both the Indian 
Right-of-Way Act and the Native American Graves Protection and 
Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) contain consent provisions.182  
Under the Indian Right-of-Way Act, there is no grant of a right-of-
way across land held in trust for a tribe, owned by a tribe, or owned by an 
individual tribe member “without the consent of the proper tribal officials . . . . 
[or] of the individual Indian owners.”183 Consent must be given in written 
form and may include restrictions or conditions.184 Although the Secretary of 
the Interior formally grants the right-of-way, the grant is improper without 
consent.185 The grant does not change or transfer ownership of the land, 
leaving the tribal property interest intact.186 This requirement is also applied 
in multiple infrastructure contexts, including construction of railway and 
telephone lines,187 power and communication facilities,188 and pipelines.189 
 
181 ANNOUNCEMENT OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE 
RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, supra note 70. 
182 25 U.S.C. §§ 324, 3001–02. 
183 Id. § 324.  
184 See 25 C.F.R. § 169.107 (2019) (providing that applicant for right-of-way across tribal 
land must secure tribal authorization and written agreement with tribe to grant a right-of-
way, noting that “[t]he consent document may impose restrictions or conditions; any 
restrictions or conditions automatically become conditions and restrictions in the grant.”). 
185 25 U.S.C. § 324. 
186 Id.; see, e.g., Murphy v. State, 124 P.3d 1198, 1203 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005) (“The Act 
thus creates an easement or right-of-way for public highways, with title to the underlying 
lands remaining in the Creek Nation and its subsequent allottees, who took their allotment 
subject to the right-of-way.”). 
187 25 U.S.C. §§ 312, 319. 
188 43 U.S.C. § 961; Quechan Indian Tribe v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1096 
(S.D. Cal. 2008) (“[T]he Court finds this section mandates Quechan must hold equitable title 
to the lands adjoining the right-of-way.”). 
189 25 U.S.C. § 321; Blackfeet Indian Tribe v. Mont. Power Co., 838 F.2d 1055, 1057 (9th 
Cir. 1988) (“Pursuant to the authority granted by the 1948 Act . . . the Secretary promulgated 
a regulation in 1960 which allowed rights-of-way for oil and gas pipelines . . . .”). 




In the pipeline context, recent litigation centers large on oil and gas 
companies’ reliance on expired easements and failure to get tribal owners’ 
consent to renew the right-of-way.190 
Under NAGPRA, “intentional removal from or excavation of Native 
American [remains and] cultural items” from tribal lands is only permitted 
after obtaining consent from the appropriate tribe.191 Proof of consent must 
be given to the federal agency official who issues the required permit for 
excavation.192 When Native American remains or cultural items are on 
federal land, NAGPRA requires consultation with the appropriate tribe but 
not the tribe’s consent.193 On both tribal and federal lands, accidental 
discovery of remains or cultural items is subject to a reporting requirement.194 
In requiring tribal consent for excavation, the federal government treats tribal 
governments as guardians of both their people’s burial grounds and of the 
cultural items they may contain.195 The Senate Committee Report 
accompanying NAGPRA noted that “[t]he Committee does not intend this 
section to operate as a bar to development of Federal or tribal lands on which 
human remains or objects are found . . . [nor] to significantly interrupt or 
impair development activities on Federal or tribal lands.”196 Notwithstanding 
this promise, courts have provided remedies against agencies that failed to 
protect remains and cultural items inadvertently discovered on infrastructure 
construction sites, suggesting that prospective injunctive relief may be 
available to tribes contesting intentional excavation without tribal consent.197 
A private right of action exists under NAGPRA.198 Even if that were not the 
 
190 See, e.g., Davilla v. Enable Midstream Partners L.P., 913 F.3d 959, 968 (10th Cir. 2019) 
(“The undisputed facts—expiration of the easement, specifically—show that Enable lacks a 
legal right to keep the pipeline in the ground. The consent forms would not allow a reasonable 
jury to find otherwise.”); Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M. v. Barboan, 857 F.3d 1101, 1107 (10th Cir. 
2017) (“In January 2015, the BIA notified PNM that it could not approve the renewal 
application without that consent.”); W. Ref. S.W., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 450 F. 
Supp. 3d 1214, 1230 (D.N.M. 2020) (“[T]he Court cannot say that the IBIA’s decision to 
require remainderman consent is based on an impermissible construction of the 1948 Right-
of-Way Act or an unreasonable decision to look to the common law.”). 
191 25 U.S.C. § 3002. 
192 43 C.F.R. § 10.3(b)(4) (2019). 
193 25 U.S.C. § 3002. 
194 Id. 
195 Alix Rogers, Owning Geronimo but Not Elmer McCurdy: The Unique Property Status of 
Native American Remains, 60 B.C. L. REV. 2347, 2384 (2019). 
196 S. REP. NO. 101-473, at 7 (1990). 
197 See, e.g., Yankton Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1027 
(D.S.D. 2002) (granting preliminary injunction requiring Army Corps of Engineers to cease 
construction of a recreation area following Plaintiff’s showing that the agency was aware of 
inadvertent discovery of indigenous remains). 
198 25 U.S.C. § 3013; San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 2d 860, 886 
(D. Ariz. 2003). 
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case, grievances against a federal agency may be brought in federal court 
under the APA.199 
Though these statutes and accompanying regulations are short on 
detail as to the procedures for obtaining tribal consent and consequences for 
violation of duties to obtain the same, consent could be a viable engagement 
device in the context of large infrastructure project planning and permitting. 
Procedure both from authorizing statutes and from the APA would provide 
better protection for tribes. A clear requirement of written consent would lay a 
path for judicial and congressional enforcement (and ideally for less litigation 
given agencies’ knowledge of the statutory requirement for clear tribal consent). 
Consent would be used only when infrastructure projects have the potential to 
impact tribal lands; the issue of indirect impacts on tribal lands based on adjacent 




 Consultation between tribes and federal agencies on large 
infrastructure projects has failed and will continue to fail. The statutory and 
regulatory protections offered under NHPA and NEPA are inadequate, 
providing for neither meaningful administrative and judicial review nor 
effective congressional oversight. Litigation brought by tribes alleging failure 
to consult, while seldom rewarding Plaintiffs due to the deferential arbitrary 
and capricious standard and the nonbinding nature of consultation policy, is 
frequent and will likely become more so without a shift in engagement 
strategy. The spirit of Executive Order 13,175 and subsequent executive 
memoranda suggests that, at some level, there is a desire from the federal 
government to engage tribes as fellow sovereigns and to recognize tribal 
rights and the impact, potential or realized, that major infrastructure projects 
have on tribal interests.  
Agencies will not adequately engage sovereign tribes impacted by 
major infrastructure projects so long as Congress continues to lean on 
consultation, a fundamentally inadequate engagement device. Scholars 
persisting in advocating for improvements to consultation policies only 
legitimize this flawed approach to tribe-agency engagement. At best, 
consultation doesn’t work, and at worst, it creates administrative cover for 
bad actions by agencies and private parties. Four other engagement devices—
 
199 See Bonnichsen v. United States, 367 F.3d 864, 874–75 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that 
review of Interior Secretary’s action under NAGPRA is “governed by the APA, which 
instructs courts to ‘hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions 
found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with law’”). 
200 With NAGPRA, intentional excavation of tribal remains or cultural artifacts on federal 
land puts tribes back in the problematic role of consultant with no tangible rights. 




negotiated rulemaking, adversarial adjudication, negotiated compact with 
mediation, and consent—already exist in federal Indian law and provide 
potential alternatives to consultation. Congress must be intentional in 
evaluating and codifying these alternatives where they best mitigate harms 
and maximize benefits to engaging parties. To honor the policies behind 
executive directives to engage tribes as fellow sovereigns, Congress must 
adopt and codify engagement mechanisms that provide better oversight and 
legal protections for tribes. 
 
